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On Engster’s Care-Justification of the Specialness Thesis 
about Health Care 
 
ABSTRACT: 
To say health is ‘special’ is to say that it has a moral significance that differentiates it 
from other goods (cars, say, or radios) and, as a matter of justice, warrants distributing it 
separately. In this essay, I critique a new justification for the specialness thesis about 
health care (STHC) recently put forth by Daniel Engster. I argue that, regrettably, 
Engster’s justification of STHC ultimately fails and fails on much the same grounds as 
have previous justifications of STHC. However, I also argue that Engster’s argument still 
adds something valuable to the debate around STHC insofar as it reminds us that the 
moral significance of health care may be wider than simply its effect on the incidence of 
disability and disease: one further reason we may think health care is morally significant 
is because it concerns the treatment and care of those who are already unwell. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 To say health is ‘special’ is to say that it has a moral significance that 
differentiates it from other goods and, as a matter of justice, warrants distributing it 
separately.[1] (By health care here it is usually meant all those treatments and services 
typically covered by a comprehensive public health service: i.e. primary, secondary and 
tertiary care as well as some public health measures).[2] 
Although few policy documents refer explicitly to this idea, one might see it as 
underpinning much of the way we approach matters of health policy, particularly around 
funding. Why fund health care through public taxation? We do not do this to ensure that 
everyone has equal access to a car, or a television. Why not have a system wherein 
people’s access to health care is dependent upon their ability to pay, with each individual 
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purchasing whatever health care goods they are able on the open market? Well, one of the 
things we might say in response to these questions is that there is something different 
about health care, that health care services have a moral significance that differentiates 
them from other goods and which, as a matter of justice, demands that we distribute them 
differently, perhaps in a more egalitarian fashion. 
In light of the apparent prevalence of the specialness thesis about health care (or 
STHC), it is perhaps surprising that in recent years it has come to be treated with a degree 
of scepticism within the philosophical community. For some, of course, STHC has never 
been justifiable.[3 - 9] More damningly, though, even some of STHC’s one-time 
advocates, such as Norman Daniels,[10-12]  have now largely abandoned it, favouring 
instead the wider claim that all goods that meet health needs are special, rather than just 
health care.[2, 13-15] 
If right, this finding could have significant ramifications for the way we fund 
health systems. For if something like STHC is the reason why we tend to distribute health 
care independently of ability to pay, then proof that we have no good reason for thinking 
STHC is true would likewise suggest that we have little moral justification for 
distributing health care differently from other goods. (Although, perhaps, there might be 
certain non-moral justifications). After all, assuming we think it is morally acceptable to 
distribute some goods according to ability to pay, and we have no reason to think health 
care is any different from any other sort of social good, why not distribute it through the 
market as well?  
Some philosophers may demur at this point, arguing that the current consensus is 
not that health care is not special, it is just that there are a lot of other goods that are also 
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special – including housing, sanitation, education and so on – with health care still one of 
that bundle, being one good that helps us meet health needs. However, even accepting 
this line of reasoning, we are still forced to conclude that health care is, at most, one of a 
bundle of special goods and potentially not even a particularly prominent member of that 
bundle. Whichever way one cuts it, then, findings from the philosophical literature seem 
to suggest that health care is a lot less special than we thought it was and allocation 
according to ability to pay may be far less of an injustice. 
In an attempt to turn back this tide of philosophical opinion, Daniel Engster has 
recently put forth a new defence of STHC, one which he takes to justify the claim that 
health care is special where other theories have failed.[16] The main novelty of Engster’s 
thesis, as he explains, lies in the fact that, on his account, health care’s specialness is less 
a product of its role ‘in promoting health’ as in ‘providing individuals with everyday 
medical care’.[16] For Engster then, appreciation of the moral significance of health 
care’s ‘caring dimensions’ can account for health care’s specialness in a way its ‘health 
dimensions’ (perhaps) cannot.[16] 
In this article, I argue that, regrettably, Engster’s justification of STHC ultimately 
fails and fails on much the same grounds as have previous justifications of STHC. 
Despite this failure, though, I think Engster’s account does have something valuable to 
add to the debate around STHC. In directing our attention toward health care’s ‘care 
dimensions’, Engster’s thesis reminds us that health care’s moral significance may be 
wider than simply its effect on the incidence of disability and disease. 
The article proceeds as follows. In Section One I foreground Engster’s thesis by 
setting out a traditional account of claims made by STHC. Here I draw mainly on an 
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authoritative and minimalist account of STHC by Segall. In Section Two, I then review 
Engster’s new care-justification of STHC. In Section Three, I explain why I think his 
argument fails before going on to highlight what I think Engster’s contribution adds to 
our discussion around STHC in Section Four. I conclude in Section Five. 
 
 
1. THE SPECIALNESS THESIS ABOUT HEALTH CARE 
What might it mean to say that health care is ‘special’? In recent years, 
conceptions of this thesis have tended to coalesce around the kind of claim set out at the 
start of this essay, one originally articulated by Shlomi Segall.[1] On Segall’s account, to 
say health care is special is to say that it is ‘morally important in ways that justify 
distributing medical resources in isolation from the way in which other social goods…are 
distributed’.[1] Following Michael Walzer’s account of what it means to distribute one 
good in isolation from another,[17] Segall argues that STHC is most usefully exercised 
when it is understood as the claim that, given health care’s moral significance, the fact 
that person possesses Y ought not determine how much health care they are allocated. 
As well as being one of the more popular accounts of STHC in the literature, there 
are a couple of reasons why this account of STHC in particular provides a good basis for 
our current discussion. First, Segall’s definition is parsimonious in that it offers a 
formulation of STHC divorced from a number of extraneous claims, sometimes talked 
about in conjunction with STHC (including by Segall) but which can add an extra 
explanatory burden on justifications of that thesis. Three such claims are worth noting: i) 
that health care is uniquely special; ii) that it is the most important or chief good;[18] and 
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iii) that the pattern of distribution demanded by health care’s specialness is an egalitarian 
one.[19,10] None of these claims are explicitly ruled out by Segall’s definition of STHC 
and thus admit to combination. We might, for example, define the specialness thesis as 
the idea that health care is morally important in ways that justify distributing medical 
resources in isolation from other social goods and that it is the most important or chief 
good. At the same time, however, nothing about STHC demands we include these claims 
either. In order to ensure, then, that we test Engster’s care-justification of STHC against 
the barest possible definition of STHC – one which correspondingly admits the widest 
possible range of justificatory theories – Segall’s account is the best candidate available. 
By Segall’s definition, it would be of no embarrassment to Engster if his thesis did not 
also justify, say, health care’s status as the chief good. Rather his theory only needs to 
show that it ought to be distributed differently from other goods. 
A second virtue of Segall’s account, one that directly follows from its parsimony, 
is its inclusivity. That is, one way we might think of Segall’s formulation is as an attempt 
to describe what a number of authors have meant when they talk about the idea that 
health care is special. In adopting Segall’s description of STHC then, we ensure that our 
assessment of Engster’s care-justification is situated squarely within the existing 
literature around health’s specialness and that it is being held to the same standards as are 
other accounts. 
To sum up then, on the account of STHC I shall be using in this article to say that 
health care is ‘special’ is to say that, as a matter of justice, it is morally important in ways 
that justify distributing medical resources in isolation from the way other social goods are 
distributed, (with ‘distributing X in isolation’ meaning that the fact that person possesses 
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Y ought not determine how much of X they are allocated). Moreover, as I understand it, 
in making this claim, STHC does not also claim that health care is uniquely special, nor 
the most important or chief good, nor does it claim that health care’s moral significance 
demands its distribution in any particular pattern (egalitarian or otherwise). What it does 
say, however, is that insofar as any health care treatments or services are allocated simply 
according to, say, P’s level of wealth or ability to pay – that is, according to the market – 
such processes of distribution are necessarily unjust. 
 
 
2. ENGSTER’S CARE-JUSTIFICATION OF SHTC  
How, then, does Engster go about justifying STHC? Engster’s principal thought 
here is that that ‘care…the other half of health care…provides the best reason for states 
to continue subsidizing comprehensive health services’.[16] In advancing this thesis, 
Engster takes his theory to be sharply distinguished from all those theories that have 
sought to justify STHC on the basis of health care’s ‘health dimensions’ – most notably 
Daniels’s opportunity-justification of STHC.[10-12] To make this explicit, Engster draws 
what he takes to be a strong distinction between health care’s care-directed services and 
its health-directed services. Thus, where the ‘health dimensions’ of health care cover 
‘curative measures that medical professionals take to save people’s lives or restore them 
to good health’, the ‘caring dimensions’ of health care also cover ‘all the other activities 
they regularly engage in to help individuals function as well as possible and avoid or 
minimize their pain and suffering – even when good health is not a realistic goal’.[16] In 
contrast to Daniels’ theory, then, care ethics emphasises ‘the value of everyday medical 
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care’, that impacts ‘on their everyday functioning and sense of well-being’, even though 
such minor illnesses and injuries may have ‘little or no effect’ on individuals’ opportunity 
range.[16] 
 Having made this distinction, Engster then goes on to argue that, unlike health 
care’s health dimensions, the moral significance of health care’s caring dimensions is 
accounted for first and foremost by the moral significance of care, with this, in turn, 
being accounted for in various ways. First, we might see the giving of care as demanded 
by a principle of reciprocity: ‘We all have a moral responsibility to care for others in 
need, as well as to support public policies that support the care of others because we all 
depend or have depended on the care of others in our own survival and functioning’.[16] 
Second, the care aspects of medical care can be considered morally important ‘for the 
contribution it makes to the quality of people’s lives’.[16] Third, caring for others in need 
can be seen as a matter of easy rescue (‘we have a moral duty to relieve the suffering and 
facilitate the functioning of individuals when we can do so at relatively little cost to 
ourselves’),[16] which in turn can be seen as a form of reciprocity (‘we would want such 
care for ourselves in similar circumstances’)[16] and beneficence (we ‘can recognise the 
moral force of helping them’).[16] Understood thus, Engster takes the moral significance 
of health care’s caring aspects to justify both the ‘specialness’ we accord to health care 
and the distribution of a comprehensive set of health care services through public subsidy 
across ‘at least a large portion of the population’.[16] 
As well as presenting an entirely new justification of STHC, one significant 
benefit of this account, according to Engster, is that it justifies STHC in such a way that 
avoids one pressing objection to existing, health-based justifications of STHC: the social 
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determinants of health objection. Given the importance of this latter argument in much of 
what follows, it is worth spending a brief moment looking at it here. 
What has now become known as the ‘social determinants of health objection’ was 
originally devised as a counter-argument to a defence of STHC set out by Norman 
Daniels in the early 1980s. When Daniels originally defended STHC (as noted earlier, he 
has since changed his position somewhat), he did so by starting from what he then took to 
be a relatively uncontroversial observation: namely that one thing that differentiates 
health care services from other kinds of social goods is the contribution they make to our 
health. It was this feature of health care goods, Daniels argued, that ultimately grounded 
STHC. Given the ‘strategic importance’ of health to our ‘normal opportunity range’, (that 
is, the range of opportunities open to us, given our particular society and particular 
talents), the specialness of health care can be seen to be generated by any theory 
defending a principle of fair equality of opportunity, health care goods being morally 
different from other goods in their ‘strategic’ effect on the range of opportunities we can 
normally pursue.[10] 
Now, almost as soon as it was published, this argument was criticised on a 
number of counts. However, it seems fair to say that Daniels’s thesis did not face a 
challenge he did not think it could meet until, over the course of the 1990s, many of the 
empirical claims upon which his thesis rested came under increasing pressure from new 
research in social epidemiology into health’s ‘social determinants’. Famously, this 
research found that while health care did have a significant effect on the incidence of 
disease and disability, at least as significant, indeed perhaps even more significant, were 
the social determinants of health, i.e. our social and psychological environment, 
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environment in early childhood, working environment, unemployment and job insecurity, 
friendship and social cohesion, social exclusion, effects of alcohol and other drugs, 
access to healthy food, and so on.[20] Of course, these findings did not falsify Daniels’s 
claim that health care has a strategic effect on one’s normal opportunity range. However, 
as Daniels was quick to realise, it did call into question health care’s relative significance 
in this regard. Put briefly, if the matter at hand was which goods were best placed to 
lower the incidence of disease and disability (as it was for Daniels), then a whole host of 
other goods and services should be considered special before health care, diluting health 
care’s distinctiveness, importance and, ultimately, its specialness as a result. [1, 6, 21] 
For Engster, then, one of the benefits of his thesis is that it is able to avoid this 
objection to STHC. As he explains, here it might be wondered ‘why the social 
determinants of health literature does not undermine care-based justification for public 
health care just as it did for the health-based justification…why not invest in the social 
determinants of health rather than health care?’.[16] In response, Engster argues that even 
under ‘ideal social and environmental conditions’ – i.e. even when all social determinants 
of health had been fulfilled – ‘comprehensive health-care services would still be 
necessarily to help people cope with injury, disease and deterioration’.[16] Hence, while 
‘it makes sense to focus on the social and environmental determinants of health’ when 
‘the goal is to reduce early mortality and promote good health’, when it comes to 
‘mitigating the effects of the illnesses, injuries, and bodily and mental decay that are 
unavoidable parts of human life’, ‘medical care…will always be important’.[16]  
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3. TWO PROBLEMS WITH ENGSTER’S ACCOUNT 
For reasons I will go on to discuss in Section Four, I think Engster’s care-
justification of STHC does have something important to say about health care’s moral 
significance, maybe even its specialness. However, to my mind, if we are to follow 
Engster’s theory to the letter we must also conclude that it cannot justify STHC.  
First, despite his claims to the contrary, Engster’s account looks like it is still 
susceptible to the social determinants of health objection. On this point, Engster does not 
always help himself, for his own response to this objection fails to recognise the main 
point of the argument. As set out above, Engster seems to think that his justification of 
STHC resists the social determinants of health objection because it shows that even in a 
world where policy makers had done everything possible to address health’s social 
determinants, a public health services would still be necessary. However, as is clear from 
the discussion above, the evidence on health’s social determinants did not undermine the 
specialness of health care because it suggested health care is no longer necessary. Rather, 
as Daniels notes, it undermined STHC because it revealed that health care was not the 
only good that might help resolve the problems to which health care was directed.[1,22] 
Hence, insofar as Engster proves that a comprehensive health care service would still be 
necessary in a world where all the social determinants of health had been addressed, his 
argument answers a question that no-one had really asked. 
The real question raised by the social determinants of health objection, when 
applied to Engster’s thesis, is this: given what we now know about health’s social 
determinants, is there is any reason to think that more could be done to meet what 
Engster describes as health care’s ‘care dimensions’ through action on health’s social 
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determinants than through the provision of health care? Regrettably, though, in respect to 
this question, Engster’s thesis looks fallible. The basic problem here is that because 
Engster takes health care’s ‘caring dimensions’ to be addressing effectively the same 
problems as health care’s ‘health dimensions’, there seems good reason to think that, 
again, we could do a better job of responding to those problems through action on 
health’s social determinants than the provision of a comprehensive health service. 
There is, perhaps, a degree of ambiguity here, for Engster is not always entirely 
clear about exactly how health care’s ‘care dimensions’ do differ from its ‘health 
dimensions’. At some points it can look like Engster wants to argue that this distinction is 
really about the ‘severity’ of the problem the given service is intended to alleviate. On 
this view, then, while health care’s health-directed activities cover treatments for ‘major’ 
disabilities and diseases, its care-directed activities cover treatments for ‘minor’ ailments. 
Elsewhere, though, Engster seems to argue that the distinction between health-directed 
health care and care-directed health care is a matter of how far a given treatment is 
intended to bring its recipient back to a state of good health. Thus, where the ‘health 
dimensions of health care’ cover restorative activities (those that aim ‘to save people’s 
lives or restore them to good health’),[16] the ‘caring dimensions of health care’ cover 
lenitive activities (those that, more modestly, aim to ‘help individuals function as well as 
possible and avoid or minimize their pain and suffering’,[16] or, in other words, to take 
them some of the way to full-functioning, ensure they plateau at some point below full 
functioning or slow down their rate of deterioration). 
It looks like there might be problems with both these distinctions. For example, 
the restorative/lenitive distinction seems to face an aggregation problem: when does the 
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administration of several lenitive treatments in conjunction add up to what is, in effect, a 
restorative treatment? Regardless of these issues though, and whichever of the two 
distinctions Engster ultimately wants to use, it still looks like, for Engster, both health 
care’s health-directed activities and its care-directed activities are broadly intended to 
address the same set of problems: which is to say, people suffering from disabilities or 
falling ill. This being so, we might still think we can do more to ensure individuals do not 
suffer from such problems through action on health’s social determinants than we could 
by providing health care. Engster’s care-justification for STHC therefore falls foul of the 
social determinants of health objection in precisely the same way Daniels’s did before it. 
How might Engster respond to this objection? One path he might take here, 
perhaps, is to follow Daniels’s more recent arguments and to claim that even if his theory 
fails to establish STHC, it does succeed in justifying a specialness thesis about all those 
goods that meet care needs – which is to say, any good that is able to help with ‘minor’ 
ailments, or those problems that can only be alleviated rather than cured. 
Now, there are, I think, good reasons to doubt these sorts of positions are 
sustainable (see, for example, Wilson’s worries about Daniels’s specialness thesis about 
all those goods that meet health needs).[23] However, even assuming that such positions 
are attractive, Engster’s account actually fares far worse than Daniels’s. This is because 
another problem with Engster’s account is that it fails to show how the particular kind of 
moral significance we attach to health care’s ‘care-directed activities’ is any different 
from the moral significance we attach to any other sort of good. 
Again, there is a degree of ambiguity here, for, as described in the previous 
section, Engster claims that the moral significance of health care’s care dimensions can 
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be accounted for in a number of ways. However, one point he stresses is that the reason 
medical care’s care activities are morally important is by virtue of the ‘contribution’ they 
make ‘to the quality of people’s lives’; a point which he appears to pick up in much of his 
talk around the importance of relieving pain and suffering.[16] Yet, if this is what makes 
the care dimensions of health care morally special, then Engster’s argument seems 
susceptible to the same counter-argument that various authors have made against other, 
more utilitarian defences of STHC: namely, that it becomes difficult to see why health 
care is any different from any other social good in this respect.[11, 24, 25] After all, if 
health care’s moral significance lies in its ability to relieve pain and suffering (to make a 
difference to our ‘quality of life’), why should we think it is any different from a good 
holiday, or a day at the cricket? Engster’s account of the moral significance of health 
care’s ‘care dimensions’, then, appears to violate a key desideratum of any theory 
attempting to justify STHC: namely, it does not provide a coherent account of how, by 
virtue of its particular kind of moral significance, health care differs from at least most 
other sorts of goods. 
 
 
4. WHAT ENGSTER GETS RIGHT 
Following the arguments above, then, there seems good reason to doubt that 
Engster’s thesis can justify either the specialness thesis about health care or even some 
sort of specialness thesis about ‘goods meeting care needs’. However, despite these 
shortcomings, I think Engster’s argument still adds something valuable to the debate 
around STHC. Most notably, in directing our attention to ‘care…the other half of health 
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care’,[16] Engster reminds us that the moral significance of health care may be wider 
than simply its effect on the incidence of disability and disease. Rather, one further 
reason we may think health care is morally significant is because it concerns the 
treatment and care of those who are already unwell. In this, I think Engster actually hits 
on a characteristic of health care that does differentiate it from other goods, even those 
goods through which we might affect the social determinants of health. For although 
action on say, our social and psychological environment, or environment in early 
childhood, may help reduce the chances we get ill, or suffer a disability, none of these 
measures will have any effect on us once we actually do fall ill, or suffer a disability. To 
remedy that, we need health care. 
It is this kind of thought, I think, that seems to motivate much of Engster’s 
discussion about the ‘caring’ side of health care. Now, unfortunately, as we have seen, 
Engster’s theory ultimately fails to build on this idea in a way that would allow him to 
justify STHC, (most notably because he ends up describing the ‘caring’ side of health 
care as so close to its ‘health’ side that it renders the thesis open to the social 
determinants of health objection). However, looking past the particulars of Engster’s 
theory for a moment, we might still think that if the specialness of health care (and health 
care alone) is to be established, then one promising line of enquiry would be to consider 
its importance with respect to the treatment of those already unwell. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
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In this article, I have reviewed a new justification for the specialness thesis about 
health care recently put forth by Daniel Engster. I have argued that, regrettably, Engster’s 
thesis ultimately fails to justify STHC. However, I have also argued that there is much of 
value in his work. Most notably, one of the things Engster’s focus on care does is to 
direct our attention to a facet of health care’s moral significance often neglected in the 
secondary literature: that is, the extent to which it concerns the treatment of those already 
unwell. If STHC is to be established, and the public provision of health care to be 
defended morally, there seems good reason to think it may well be by starting from this 
initial thought. 
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